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INSURANCE LAW
W. Shelby McKenzie*
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE-USE
Carter v. City Parish Government' is the fourth in a series of supreme
court decisions which suggests a process for deciding the often difficult
question of whether liability arises out of the "use" of an automobile. 2
Carter involved the death by drowning of a ten-year old girl. A severe
storm resulted in the flooding of an expressway underpass. Highway
officials established barricades at all entrances in order to prevent access
to the flooded underpass. When last seen, the deceased was in the vehicle
driven by her uncle. By circumstantial evidence, it was concluded that
the uncle, who was intoxicated, drove around the entrance barricades and
proceeded along the expressway until his vehicle encountered the flood
waters of the underpass. The girl's body was found 300 to 450 feet from
the partially submerged vehicle in which she had been riding.
The parents of the deceased girl brought suit against State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm) under two policies-the
uncle's automobile liability insurance and their own uninsured motorist
coverage. In order for coverage to exist under either policy, the plaintiffs
had to show that the uncle's liability arose out of the use of his auto-
mobile. Without first determining the uncle's liability, both lower courts
found that the death did not arise out of use of the automobile by utiliz-
ing tests developed in earlier decisions.3 The supreme court criticized this
approach, stating that proper analysis required the courts to consider, in
order, two separate questions: "(1) Was the conduct of the insured of
which the plaintiff complains a legal cause of the injury? (2) Was it a
use of the automobile?"' A court need not reach the use question unless
the legal cause question could be answered affirmatively, and coverage
would exist only if both these questions could be answered affirmatively.
The supreme court declared further that it was incumbent upon the
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1. 423 So. 2d 1080 (La. 1982).
2. Automobile liability policies protect against the specific risk of liability "arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of vehicles. Policies frequently define "use"
to include the loading and unloading of the vehicle. Conversely, many other liability policies,
including homeowner's policies and comprehensive general liability policies, expressly exclude
coverage for liability "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading and unloading
of vehicles." In determining whether there is coverage under an automobile policy or in
determining whether coverage is excluded under other policies, courts must decide whether
an accident arose out of the "use" of a vehicle:
3. Carter v. City Parish Gov't, 409 So. 2d 345 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1981).
4. 423 So. 2d at 1087.
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courts to apply the duty-risk analysis in answering the legal cause ques-
tion. This approach to the legal cause issue would also force the courts
to focus on two distinct questions: "(a) was the conduct complained of
a cause in fact of the harm? (b) was the alleged tortfeasor under a duty
to protect against the particular risk involved?" 5 The supreme court ex-
pressly criticized lower court decisions which have attempted to resolve
the use issue without first making a duty-risk analysis to determine whether
the conduct complained of was a legal cause of the injury.6
In Carter, the supreme court found that but for the uncle's conduct
in ignoring the barricades and driving into the flood waters, the young
girl probably would not have drowned. Thus, his conduct was a cause-in-
fact of the harm. The court also concluded that the risk of drowning
by a passenger of tender age is contemplated by the legal duties of a
motorist to obey the warning of barricades and to drive in a reasonable
and prudent manner under hazardous conditions.7 Having determined that
the legal cause of the accident was the uncle's breach of duties in opera-
tion of the vehicle, the court turned to the second question of the use
analysis-was the conduct complained of a use of the automobile? Since
negligent operation of the vehicle was the legal cause of the accident,
the liability clearly arose out of use for which there was coverage under
the policies.
As noted previously, Carter builds on three earlier supreme court
decisions-Fertitta v. Palmer,' LeJeune v. Allstate Insurance Co.,9 and
5. Id. at 1084.
6. The court specifically criticized the use of tests which rely heavily on proximate
cause concepts as applied in Sherville v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 1181
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Tillman v. Canal Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1974); Ramsey v. Continental Ins. Co., 286 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Burris, 240 So. 2d 408 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Baudin
v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
7. These duties, the court found, clearly protect a passenger against the risk of drowning
in the vehicle or while escaping therefrom. Since the deceased was not found in the immediate
vicinity of the vehicle, however, State Farm argued that the circumstantial evidence did
not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the child's drowning resulted from other risks
which should not be included within the scope of the driver's duties. The court disagreed,
finding the risk that the child unknowingly failed to select the best path to safety or that
she was led in the wrong direction by her uncle as rescuer were within the scope of the
duty. The only other hypothesis-that she knowingly and voluntarily chose to brave the
other deeper waters-was rejected by the court as unreasonable, on the basis of the rebut-
table presumption applied by the courts of appeal in other cases that a deceased exercised
due care in conformity with the instinct for self-preservation. See Callahan v. Town of
Bunkie, 287 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Ebarb v. Southern Farm Casualty Ins.
Co., 251 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 259 La. 881, 253 So. 2d 215 (1971);
Gant v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 234 So. 2d 776 (La. App. ist Cir.), writ denied,
256 La. 376, 236 So. 2d 503 (1970).
8. 252 La. 336, 211 So. 2d 282 (1968).
9. 365 So. 2d 471 (La. 1978).
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Picou v. Ferraro.l" A familiarity with these decisions and the principles
they establish is necessary to place Carter in context.
In Fertitta, the issue was whether an accident arose out of the
unloading of a neon sign from a truck. The sign had been handed to
the employee who would install it, but the sign had never been placed
in a stationary position after its removal from the truck. The insurance
policy on the truck covered damages arising out of use of the truck, and
the policy stated that use of the truck "includes the loading and unloading
thereof.""1 Rejecting the artificial tests which have been developed for
determining whether an accident arose out of the loading or unloading
of a vehicle, 2 the supreme court approved the "common sense" approach
utilized by the court of appeal. "This simply means that the court should
decide whether, under a particular set of facts, the act causing the injury
constituted part of the 'unloading' process as that term is commonly
understood." 3 The common sense approach led both courts to conclude
that the employee was in the process of installing the sign at the time
the accident occurred, and the injury had no connection with the unloading
of the truck.
LeJeune v. Allstate Insurance Co."' involved a collision between a
hearse in a funeral procession on the inferior highway and a vehicle on
the favored highway. The court concluded that the accident was caused
in part by the negligence of the deputy sheriff who was assigned to escort
the funeral procession and had failed to protect the intersection. The issue
was whether his negligence arose out of the use of his vehicle.' 5 The court
found that the negligence did not arise out of use of the vehicle because
the deputy's duty existed independently of his use of an automobile.
Although he could have used his police car to discharge his law enforce-
ment duty, it was not any use of his vehicle itself that led to liability.
The liability arose out of the deputy's failure to warn, with the vehicle
or otherwise.' 6
In Picou v. Ferrara,'7 it was argued that coverage was not excluded
under a comprehensive general liability policy for allegations of negligent
entrustment of a vehicle to a corporate employee. The plaintiff's motor-
10. 412 So. 2d 1297 (La. 1982).
11. 252 La. at 341, 211 So. 2d at 284.
12. See Spurlock v. Boyce-Harvey Mach. Co., 90 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
13. 252 La. at 343, 211 So. 2d at 285.
14. 365 So. 2d 471 (La. 1978).
15. The court was faced with the determination whether there was coverage under the
sheriff's Law Enforcement Officer's Professional Liability policy which expressly excluded
"bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, or use, loading or unloading, of
land motor vehicles." Id. at 478.
16. The court also held that there was no coverage under the automobile liability policy
insuring the deputy's vehicle, since the accident did not arise out of its use.
17. 412 So. 2d 1297 (La. 1982).
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cycle was struck by an automobile owned and operated by an employee
of the defendant corporation. The allegations against the corporation
included both vicarious liability for the negligent operation of .the auto
by its employee and the corporation's independent negligence in hiring
an incompetent driver. The corporation filed a third-party demand against
its general liability insurer, whose policy expressly excluded coverage for
damages arising out of the use of automobiles. On cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, both lower courts held that while the claim asserting the
vicarious liability of the corporation fell within the policy's coverage
exclusion, the claim based upon negligent entrustment did not. The lower
courts thought that the corporation's duty to permit only those persons
competent to operate an automobile to do so existed independently of
any duties or liabilities with respect to actual use of the automobile; thus,
they held that the suit based on negligent entrustment did not arise out
of use and that the coverage exclusion did not apply. The supreme court
reversed, holding that the policy's coverage exclusion extended to both
of these claims. The court focused on the theory of liability in determin-
ing the applicability of the policy exclusion. The court felt that the issue
of coverage, i.e., whether the harm arose out of the use of an automobile,
could be decided by answering a single question: Was use of the
automobile an essential element in the theory of liability? The court found
that use of the automobile was essential to both theories of liability-the
employer's: responsibility for its employee's acts and the negligent choice
of the driver.' 8
From this quartet of supreme court decisions-Fertitta, LeJeune, Picou
and Carter-the following process for resolving the use issue can be'"
gleaned: Through the duty-risk analysis, it must be determined whether
the insured's conduct of which the plaintiff complains is a legal cause
of the accident., If the conduct complained of is a legal cause of the harm,
it must then be determined whether that harm arose out of the use of
a vehicle. In order for the harm to arise out of use, the automobile must
be essential to the theory of liability; the specific duty breached by the
insured must flow from use of the automobile. If the specific duty breached
18. It distinguished LeJeune under which the theory of liability was breach of law enforce-
ment duties independent from the use of the automobile. It also distinguished Frazier v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co,., 347 So. 2d 1275 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), which involved
a claim under a homeowner's policy for negligent supervision of a young child who was
in the care of the insureds at the time she was struck by an automobile. The court noted
that the automobile in Frazier "was an essential fact of the accident, but only incidental
to the theory of liability under the homeowner's policy." Id. at 1300. See also Hill v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Hurston v. Dufour, 292 So. 2d
733 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), in which the courts rejected the contention that the vicarious
liability of a parent for the. negligent operation of a vehicle did not arise out of the use
of the vehicle. The courts held that coverage for such liability was excluded in the homeowner's
policy.
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by the insured existed independently of the automobile, then liability does
not arise out of use even though the duty could have been performed
by use of an automobile. In the final analysis, common sense must be
utilized in making the determination whether use of the automobile is
an essential ingredient of the duty breached by the insured.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has wisely rejected the utilization of
an artificial formula to resolve use issues. As long as the courts resist
the temptation to play word games in hard cases, the process suggested
by the four supreme court decisions, with a heavy dose of common sense,
offers a sound approach to the resolution of this often difficult issue.' 9
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Workers' Compensation
The Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act reserves the right of
injured workers to recover damages from third persons and further
provides that any person obligated to pay compensation may maintain
19. Other cases which have involved the issue of whether an accident arose out of
the "ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of vehicles" include: (1) Firearms
and firecrackers: Tobin v. Williams, 396 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Bruno v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 337 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Ramsey v.
Continental Ins. Co., 286 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Cagle v. Playland Amuse-
ment, 202 So. 2d 396 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 251 La. 403, 204 So. 2d 578 (1967);
Speziale v. Kohnke, 194 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 250 La. 469, 196
So. 2d 534 (1967). (2) Non-operator use: Garvey v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 125 So.
2d 634 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); Bolton v. North River Ins. Co., 102 So. 2d 544 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1958), cert. denied. (3) Law enforcement: Curry v. Iberville Parish Sheriff's
Office, 405 So. 2d 1387 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 1130 (La. 1982).
(4) Loading and unloading: Pullen v. Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp., 230 La. 867, 89
So. 2d 373 (1956); Copes v. Copeland Bldg. Supply, 415 So. 2d 264 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1982); Young v. E & L Lumber Co., 392 So. 2d 136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Lee v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Sherville v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 1181 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Mauterer v. Associated Indem.
Corp., 332 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Barrois v. Service Drayage Co., 250 So.
2d 135 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 259 La. 805, 253 So. 2d 66 (1971); Mays v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 242 So. 2d 264 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. Burris, 240 So. 2d 408 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Bardwell v. England Transp.
Co., 169 So. 2d 537 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Spurlock v. Boyce-Harvey Mach. Co., 90
So. 2d 417 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956). (5) Spills: Tillman v. Canal Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d
602 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), writ denied, 307 So. 2d 630 (La. 1975). (6) Children: Frazier
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 1275 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Tucker
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Baudin v.
Trader's & Gen. Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967). (7) Towing or pulling:
Johns v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 349 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Howard
v. Ponthieux, 326 So. 2d 911 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Vogt v. Hotard, 144 So. 2d 714
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied. (8) Maintenance: Chase v. Dunbar, 185 So. 2d 563
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Wall v. Windmann, 142 So. 2d 537 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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a suit against such third person for recovery of any amount which he
has paid or has become obligated to pay as compensation to an employee.2"
Overruling the rationale of decisions from four appellate circuits,2' the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,22
held that a workers' compensation insurer can maintain an action against
certain insurers providing uninsured motorist (UM) coverage for the
employee to recover the amount of compensation benefits paid to the
employee. The court reasoned that the UM insurer is a third person legally
liable to pay damages to an injured employee because it is obligated by
law and by the issuance of its policy to repair the same damage as the
tortfeasor. Such conclusion, the majority asserted, was consistent with
the legislative aims of the workmen's compensation statute to prevent
double recovery (from both the UM insurer and the compensation in-
surer) by the injured employee and to place the ultimate burden on the
tortfeasor.23 The court did impose one limitation upon a compensation
insurer's right to recover from uninsured motorist insurers. The compen-
sation insurer cannot recover out of UM coverage paid for by an employee.
The court concluded that such recovery would dilute the employee's com-
pensation benefits in violation of the compensation act's prohibition against
the direct or indirect imposition of the cost of compensation upon the
employee."'
Since the issue was raised in Johnson on an exception of no cause
of action, the policy was not in evidence. Therefore, the court did not
consider the exclusion contained in most UM policies which expressly
precludes the coverage from inuring directly or indirectly to the benefit
of any workers' compensation insurer. The UM statute neither mandates
nor expressly prohibits this exclusion. 5 Since UM coverage is mandatory
and since the Johnson decision holds that the UM insurer is a third party
against whom the compensation carrier is entitled to exercise its statutory
subrogation right, the court will probably hold that the policy exclusion
is not enforceable on the ground that the subrogated compensation carrier
succeeds to the insured's statutory right to UM coverage.26
20. See LA. R.S. 23:1101-:1103 (1964 & Supp. 1983).
21. Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 411 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982);
Lute v. City of Lake Charles, 394 So. 2d 736 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Bannon v. Edrington,
392 So. 2d 186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Gentry v. Pugh, 362 So. 2d 1154 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ denied, 363 So. 2d 922 (La. 1978); see McKenzie, Louisiana Uninsured Motorist
Coverage-After Twenty Years, 43 LA. L. Rav. 691, 714 (1983).
22. 425 So. 2d 224, 227-28 (La. 1983).
23. The statutorily specified uninsured motorists coverage is provided for the protec-
tion of injured persons; it guarantees the injured person's recovery of damages as though
the tortfeasor had been insured.
24. See 425 So. 2d at 228-29; LA. R.S. 23:1163 (1964).
25. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) (1978 & Supp. 1983).
26. Also, policies providing UM coverage generally contain reduction clauses which
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Of the two policies under consideration in Johnson, one was issued
to the employer and one to the employee. The compensation carrier was
not permitted to subrogate against the UM coverage purchased by the
employee. Presumably, this restriction would not be applicable to subroga-
tion under policies purchased by anyone other than the employee. For
example, if the employee is insured as a relative under another's policy
or has coverage because he is occupying another's insured automobile,
then the compensation carrier would be subrogated to the employee's rights
under such coverage even though the coverage was not provided by the
employer.
The courts will be called upon to resolve an interesting "stacking"
dilemma. Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(c) provides that the
occupant of an automobile not owned by him may recover under the UM
coverage available on the occupied automobile and under one additional
policy.. The additional coverage available to such occupant may include
a policy purchased by him and policies purchased by others. It would
be to the employee/occupant's advantage to choose his own policy and
to the compensation carrier's advantage to choose other coverage against
which it could exercise its subrogation rights. 7 Is the compensation carrier
subrogated to the employee/occupant's right of selection?
. The 1983 amendments to the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act
greatly strengthened the subrogation rights of the employer and compen-
sation insurer by imposing penalties upon the employee and third party
who enter into settlements without the approval of the employer or his
insurer.8 It now will be necessary for the UM insured and UM insurer
to obtain settlement approval from the compensation insurer or employer
when those parties' may be subrogated to the UM coverage.
provide that the sums received as workers' compensation benefits will be credited against
the limits of liability under UM coverage. Generally, these reduction clauses have been held
to be unenforceable. Landry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 320 So. 2d 254 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1975); Williams v. Buckelew, 246 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970). These re-
duction clauses are discussed in McKenzie, supra note 18, at 716; Johnson, The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term- Workers' Compensation, 40 LA.
L. REv. 742 (1980).
27. For example, suppose the employee who owned his own car resided with his parents
who also own an automobile and the employee was injured while operating his employer's
vehicle. Under LA. R.S. 22:1406 (D)(1)(c), the coverage on the employer's vehicle would
be primary, and under Johnson the compensation carrier would be subrogated to the
employee's rights under the employer's policy. The UM coverage under both the policy
issued to the employee and to the parents would be available as excess coverage, but under
the statute the injured person is limited to one policy. The right of selection is critical because
under Johnson the compensation carrier would be subrogated only to the rights against
the parent's coverage.
28. LA. R.S. 23:1102 (1964), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, 1st Extra. Session, No.
1, § 1.
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Legal Interest
A conflict in the circuits has been resolved by the third circuit's reversal
of position in Stroud v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 29 In Hebert v.
Ordoyne,3 ° the first circuit concluded that legal interest on a UM claim
ran from date of judicial demand as in tort actions. The third circuit
disagreed in Guidroz v. Tauzin,31 holding that a UM claim was an action
in contract and that interest ran from the date the debt became due, which
was held to be the date of judgment. Finding that Johnson v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co.32 constituted a shift in legal theory, the third circuit
in Stroud overruled its decision in Guidroz and awarded interest from
date of judicial demand.
29. 429 So. 2d 492 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
30. 388 So. 2d 407 (La. App. ist Cir. 1980).
31. 413 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
32. 425 So. 2d 224 (La. 1982).
